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Introduction 
In Citizens United vs. FEC,1 the Supreme Court struck down a Federal banning 
direct corporate expenditures on political campaigns.2 The decision has been both 
widely criticized and praised as a matter of First Amendment law.3 But it is also 
interesting as another step in the evolution of our legal views of the corporation.4
The thesis of this Article is that by viewing Citizens United through the prism of 
theories about the corporate form, it is possible to understand how both the 
majority and the dissent departed from previous Supreme Court cases on the First 
Amendment rights of corporations and to predict what arguments can be expected 
next. 
The corporation has evolved from its origins in Roman law through a 
series of four major transformations. First, the concept of the corporation as a 
separate legal person from its owners or members developed with the work of the 
civil law Commentators in the fourteenth century.5 By the end of the Middle Ages, 
the membership corporation—i.e., a corporation that had legal personality (the 
capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal responsibility), 
unlimited life, and in which members chose their successors—was well 
1. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
2. Id. at 917 (striking down 2 U.S.C § 441b (2006), which banned corporate-funded independent 
expenditures). 
3. See, e.g., Matt Bodie, Two Small Thoughts on Citizens United, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 21, 2010, 
6:13 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/01/two-small-thoughts-on-citizens-
united.html; Ira Glasser, Understanding the Citizens United Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 
2010, 9:28 PM),  
http://huffingtonpost.com/ira-glasser/understanding-the-emcitiz_b_447342.html; Lawrence 
Lessig, Institutional Integrity: Citizens United and the Path to a Better Democracy, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 22, 2010, 3:15 PM), http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/institutional-
integrity-c_b_433394.html? view=screen; Lawrence Lessig, The Democrats’ Response to
Citizens United: Not (Even Close to) Good Enough, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15, 2010, 6:37 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Lawrence-lessig/the-democrats-response-
to_b_462412.html?view=screen; Eugene Volokh, Citizens United and the Mainstream Media, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:01 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/01/21/citizens-
united-and-the-mainstream-media; Howard Wasserman, Further Thoughts on Citizens United, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:15 AM),  
http://prawfsblawg.bogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/01/further-thoughts-on-citizens-united.html. 
4. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A 
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005) 
[hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations]. 
5. Id. at 780-82 (showing that by the time of Bartulos of Sassoferato (1314-1357), the leading 
Commentator on the Corpus Juris Civilis in the fourteenth century, the concept of the 
corporation as a separate legal person was fully developed). 
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established in both civil and common law jurisdictions.6 The next important step 
was the shift from non-profit membership corporations to for-profit business 
corporations, which took place in England and the U.S. at the end of the 
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.7 The third transformation 
was the shift from closely held corporations to corporations whose shares are 
widely held and publicly traded. This also included the rise of limited liability and 
freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end of the nineteenth century and 
the beginning of the twentieth century.8 Finally, the last major transformation was 
from corporations doing business in one country to multinational enterprises 
whose operations span the globe, which began after World War II and is still 
ongoing.9 
Each of these four transformations was accompanied by changes in the 
legal conception of the corporation. What is remarkable, however, is that 
throughout all of these changes, spanning two millennia, the same three theories 
of the corporation can be discerned. Those theories are the aggregate theory, 
which views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or shareholders; the 
artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a creature of the State; and 
the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners 
nor an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers.10 
In this Article, I will first discuss how the three theories of the corporation 
are reflected in our historical jurisprudence, and then I will show how Citizens 
United fits within this tradition. Part I discusses the cyclical evolution of the three 
corporate theories from the eighteenth century onward and shows that each 
transformation brought forth all three theories, the real entity view always won 
and was the established view during periods of stability. Part II applies this 
analysis to Citizens United and its antecedents Bellotti and Austin, demonstrating 
that all three theories arise in Bellotti and Austin, but that both the majority and the 
dissent in Citizens United adopt the real entity view. Part III concludes by 
predicting that the next confrontation will distinguish between domestic and 
foreign corporations for First Amendment purposes, that all three theories will be 
advanced, and that ultimately the real entity view will prevail in this context as 
well. 
 
 
6. See, eg., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *455-73 (describing the corporate form); 
Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4, at 783. 
7. Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4 at 785-86; see, e.g., JOSEPH ANGELL & 
SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE, at v (1st ed., 
Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1832). 
8. Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4, at 793-94. 
9. Id. at 810-12. 
10.These three are standard theories found in literature. See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the 
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201. 
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1. The Cyclical Evolution of Corporate Theories11 
1.1. From Nonprofit to For-Profit Corporations 
By the time the American colonies declared themselves to be “free and 
independent states,” the corporation was well established in English law as a 
membership corporation, i.e., a corporation made up of members who selected 
their own successors, like the President and Fellows of Harvard College still do 
today. As such, a corporation had legal personality—the right to own property, sue 
and be sued, act under a common seal, and other such “chestnuts.”12 Private 
corporations were used primarily for nonprofit purposes (e.g., hospitals and 
universities), but by the eighteenth century there were also some commercial ones 
(e.g., the East India Company).13 
There were two important limitations on corporations in this period. The 
first was royal control over corporations; in England and other European countries 
corporations could only be established by royal charter. Blackstone notes that 
although in Roman law corporations could be established without “the prince’s 
consent,” “with us in England, the king’s consent is absolutely necessary.”14
Second, some degree of outside control over management was established through 
the institution of the committee of visitors, which represented the interests of the 
founder and of the wider community.15 
But other than in extraordinary cases, the real entity view of the 
corporation prevailed throughout this period, and management (the members) was 
firmly in control. “[A] corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and 
rests only in intendment and consideration of the law . . . .”16 As such, it was a 
self-perpetuating body subject to relatively little outside regulation. Corporations, 
Blackstone notes, are “artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual 
succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.”17 When the members 
11.Part II is based on Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4. 
12.ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17 (1986). For a discussion of how these basic features of 
corporate legal personality were established, see Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra
note 4. 
13.BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at ch. XVIII (classifying and describing various corporations). 
14.Id. at 460; Tipling v. Pexall, (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 1085 (K.B.) 1085 (“the King creates them”); 
see also The Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B) (providing an example of 
a charter enumerating corporate legal rights). 
15.BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *467-69. 
16.The Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B) 973. 
17.BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *455. 
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are consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their 
successors are then considered as one person in law: as one person, 
they have one will, which is collected from the sense of the majority 
of the individuals . . . for all the individual members that have existed 
from the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever hereafter 
exist, are but one person in law, a person that never dies . . . .18 
 
This “one person” then acquires all the rights of corporations, including 
perpetual succession.19 The King constituted corporations, and the King or other 
visitors exercised some degree of supervision over them, but once established the 
corporation remained subject to relatively little outside regulation.20 
This situation meant that corporate status was very desirable, especially 
since the members also enjoyed limited liability for corporate debts.21 But the 
English kings were very cautious with granting corporate charters, especially in 
the case of for-profit enterprises; only corporations that were clearly vested with a 
public purpose and benefited the public fisc, like the East India and Hudson Bay 
Companies, received royal approval and accumulated vast power.22 As more 
capital was required for commercial enterprises, promoters organized corporations 
with transferable shares and claimed that under the authority of a lost or obsolete 
charter the shareholders enjoyed limited liability.23 Then, after the South Sea 
Bubble burst in 1720, this problem (and the desire of the East India Company to 
retain its monopoly) led to the Bubble Act, under which it became a crime to 
organize such corporations without explicit royal consent.24 Although prosecutions 
under the Bubble Act were rare, it meant that the entire Industrial Revolution in 
England (1760-1820) took place outside the corporate form and without limited 
liability.25 The Bubble Act was ultimately repealed in 1825, after the Industrial 
Revolution was over, but the provision of unlimited liability for shareholders 
continued to be the rule in England until 1855.26 
 
18.Id. at *456. 
19.Id. at *463-64. 
20.See generally Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business 
Organization, 1720-1844 (2000) (discussing historical development of corporations in England). 
21.Although this was not clear in the Roman sources, it was well established by Blackstone’s time 
for royally chartered corporations. “The debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally 
extinguished by its dissolution; so that the members thereof cannot recover, or be charged with 
them, in their natural capacities.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *472. 
22.See Harris supra note 20, at 43-49 (discussing colonial corporations). 
23.Id. at 127-32. 
24.Bubble Act, 1719, 6 Geo. 1, c. 18 (Gr. Brit.); see Harris, supra note 20. 
25.For attempts to avoid the Bubble Act which led to prosecutions, see The King v. Webb, (1811) 
104 Eng. Rep. 658; The King v. Dodd, (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 670 (K.B); see Harris, supra note 
19, at 78-79. 
26.Bubble Act Repeal, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 91 (UK); Limited Liability Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 
133 (UK.). 
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This situation, which can be seen as a way of maintaining state control 
over corporations through restrictions on charters, meant that the next great shift 
in the use of corporate form took place in the fledgling United States. There, once 
the revolution was over, every state could issue corporate charters.27 The result 
was an explosion of charters for commercial enterprises.28 Joseph Angell and 
Samuel Ames’s wrote one of the first treatises on corporate law, Treatise on the 
Law of Private Corporations Aggregate, published in Boston in 1832.29 Angell 
and Ames begin their book by stating: 
The reader does not require to be told, that we have in our country an 
infinite number of corporations aggregate, which have no concern 
whatever with affairs of a municipal nature. These associations we not 
only find scattered throughout every cultivated part of the United 
States, but so engaged are they in all the varieties of useful pursuit, 
that we see them directing the concentration of mind and capital to . . . 
the encouragement and extension of the great interests of commerce, 
agriculture, and manufactures. There is a great difference in this 
respect between our own country, and the country from which we have 
derived a great portion of our laws. What is done in England by 
combination, unless it be the management of municipal concerns, is 
most generally done by a combination of individuals, established by 
mere articles of agreement. On the other hand, what is done here by 
the co-operation of several persons, is, in the greater number of  
instances, the result of a consolidation effected by an express act or 
charter of incorporation.30 
The main reason for this proliferation of corporations in the United States 
was the second great transformation in the role of the corporation in society from 
primarily a nonprofit to primarily a for-profit enterprise. As Judge Kent stated: 
27.See Angell & Ames, supra note 7, at 35. For general discussions of state corporate charters, see 
Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 177-202 (1985); Kermit L. Hall et al., 
American Legal History: Cases and Materials 115-17 (1991); Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, at 63-139 (1977). 
28.ANGELL AND AMES, supra note 7, at 35.  
29.Angell and Ames’s work was preceded by the English work of Stewart Kyd, published in 
London in 1793, but that treatise was devoted primarily to municipal corporations. See ANGELL 
& AMES, supra note 7, at vi. The Angell and Ames treatise was very successful, with eleven 
editions published through 1882. 
30.Id. at v; see also id. at 35 (“In no country have corporations been multiplied to so great an 
extent, as in our own . . . . There is scarcely an individual of respectable character in our 
community, who is not a member of, at least, one private company or society which is 
incorporated. . . . . Acts of incorporation are moreover continually solicited at every session of 
the legislature . . . .”). 
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[T]he multiplication of corporations in the United States, and the 
avidity with which they are sought, have arisen in consequence of the 
power which a large and consolidated capital gives them over business 
of every kind; and the facility which the incorporation gives to the 
management of that capital, and the security which it affords to the 
persons of its members, and to their property not vested in the 
corporate stock.31 
 
This was a profound shift, and not surprisingly it led to a revival of the 
centuries-old debate about the nature of the corporate form and its relationship to 
the shareholders and the state. This debate can be seen if we examine the opinions 
on the subject issued by the first great American jurist, John Marshall. Three of 
Marshall’s opinions, written decades apart, are particularly relevant here: Bank of 
the United States v. Deveaux,32 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,33 and 
Bank of the United States v. Dandridge.34 These opinions represent the evolution 
of his thinking on corporations, which moved from the aggregate view, Deveaux, 
to the artificial entity view Dartmouth College to the real entity view Dandridge. 
Deveaux involved an attempt by the state of Georgia to tax the Savannah 
branch of the Bank of the United States, a corporation established by Congress in 
1791, as part of the early struggles around federalism.35 The Bank was a 
membership corporation (“The president, directors and company of the bank of 
the United States”) and all the members were citizens of Pennsylvania.36 The Bank 
refused to pay the tax, and the State sent its collectors to enforce payment, 
whereupon the Bank sued the collectors in federal court, claiming diversity 
jurisdiction.37 The issue facing the court was whether a corporation made up of 
members from one state could sue citizens of another state in federal court on 
diversity grounds. This in turn required deciding between the view that “the 
individual character of the members is so wholly lost in that of the corporation, 
that the court cannot take notice of it,” and the contrary view that “a corporation is 
composed of natural persons,” that is, between the entity (artificial or real) and 
aggregate views.38 
Marshall decided in favor of the aggregate view. He stated that the 
corporation itself, “that mere legal entity,” cannot be a citizen or sue in federal 
 
31.Id. at 36 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 219 (New York City, O. 
Halsted 1827). The last sentence refers to limited liability, which will be discussed below. 
32.9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). 
33.17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
34.25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
35.Deveaux, 9. U.S. (5 Cranch) at 63, 73. 
36.Id. at 74. 
37.Id. at 63. 
38.Id. at 63-64. 
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court unless it can be regarded as “a company of individuals.”39 However, since 
the reasons that led Congress to enact diversity jurisdiction applied to corporations 
as well, Marshall was inclined to see the controversy as being between the 
members “suing in their corporate character” and their opponents.40 “The 
controversy is substantially between aliens, suing by a corporate name, and a 
citizen . . . in this case the corporate name represents persons who are members of 
the corporation.”41 The Court therefore held that federal jurisdiction existed. 
Ten years later Marshall was faced with another difficult issue involving 
corporations. In the famous Dartmouth College 42 case, the state of New 
Hampshire attempted to alter the charter of Dartmouth College (incorporated as a 
membership corporation by George III in 1769, under the name of The Trustees of 
Dartmouth College),43 by transferring the appointment of trustees to the state, 
thereby effectively taking it over.44 The trustees objected, arguing that the charter 
constituted a contract and that altering it violated the Contracts Clause of the 
Constitution.45
Marshall held that as the College was a private corporation, its charter was 
a contract and was protected by the contracts clause.46 He began by noting that 
neither the funds for the College, which came from private sources, or its 
educational character made it a public corporation.47 He then got to the heart of the 
issue—whether the act of incorporation by the state makes it possible for the state 
to take it over. In frequently quoted language, Marshall held that “[a] corporation 
is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of 
law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the 
charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very 
existence.”48 
This language reflects the artificial entity view of the corporation. Marshall 
then went on to note that, having created the corporation, the state may not treat it 
as a mere extension of itself: “this being does not share in the civil government of 
the country, unless that be the purpose for which it was created.”49 Even though its 
object is to promote governmentally approved aims, this does not make 
corporations into mere instruments of government. Instead, the corporation exists 
39.Id. at 86-87. 
40.Id. at 87-88. 
41.Id. at 91. 
42.17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 518. 
43.Id. at 518-25. 
44.Id. at 626. 
45.Id. at 588-89. 
46.Id. at 650. 
47.Id. at 635. 
48.Id. at 636. 
49.Id. 
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to represent the interest of the founder and his descendants in the aims for which it 
was founded. In the United States, this interest is protected by the contracts clause, 
although in England, Marshall recognized, Parliament had the power to annul the 
charter.50 In this country “the body corporate, as possessing the whole legal and 
equitable interest, and completely representing the donors, for the purpose of 
executing the trust, has rights which are protected by the constitution.”51 
It should be noted that while Marshall held that the state may not take over 
a private corporation, even one founded for public ends, the emphasis on the 
artificial nature of the corporation left ample room for state regulation via the 
original charter. Since states were busy granting charters by the hundreds, the 
Dartmouth opinion thus enabled the states to regulate corporations, should they 
wish to do so. 
Finally, six years later, Marshall was once more called to opine on the 
nature of corporations in another case involving the Bank of the United States.52 
Dandridge involved a suit by the Bank, regarding a bond executed by one of its 
cashiers, in which the defendant argued that the bond had never been approved by 
the Board of Directors, as required by the charter of incorporation. The key issue 
was whether the level of evidence required of corporations was higher than that 
required of individuals, since corporations are incapable of acting without 
writing.53 Justice Story, writing for the Court, held that no distinction should be 
made: “The same presumptions are . . . applicable to corporations.”54 Marshall, 
however, dissented. He argued that 
 
The corporation being one entire impersonal entity, distinct from the 
individuals who compose it, must be endowed with a mode of action 
peculiar to itself, which will always distinguish its transactions from 
those of its members. This faculty must be exercised according to its 
own nature . . . This can be done only by writing.55 
 
The Court’s view was the more pragmatic one, but Marshall’s view was 
more consistent with the real entity view of the corporation as distinct from its 
members, individually or collectively. It certainly forms an interesting contrast 
with the views he expressed in the Deveaux case sixteen years earlier. 
How can one explain the shift in Marshall’s view of the corporation from 
aggregate (Deveaux) to artificial (Dartmouth College) to real (Dandridge)? In 
part, it stems from the circumstances of these particular cases. In Deveaux, 
 
50.Id. at 643. 
51.Id. at 654. 
52.Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1825) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
53.Id. at 65-67. 
54.Id. at 70. 
55.Id. at 91-92 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
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Marshall wanted to confer diversity jurisdiction to protect a federal institution (he 
was, after all, a Federalist), and the only way to do so was to look through the 
corporation to its members. In Dartmouth College, the issue involved the 
relationship of private corporations (albeit “imbued with a public purpose,” the 
full-fledged private/public distinction had not yet evolved) to the state, and thus 
Marshall emphasized the role of the state in creating the corporation, while 
placing clear limits on its ability to regulate corporations thereafter. These limits 
were required as the result of the proliferation of corporations, especially for-
profit business corporations, since otherwise the state would be able to take over 
purely private businesses. In practice, the result in Dartmouth College favored the 
real entity view: once a private corporation was created, it could no longer be 
taken over—or perhaps even overly regulated—by the state. Thus, it may not be 
surprising that by the time he came to write his Dandridge dissent Marshall took 
the real entity view, even though it contradicted his opinion in Deveaux (which 
was not mentioned). 
Two important legal developments during the same period strengthened 
the real entity view and weakened the aggregate and artificial entity views of the 
corporation: the rise of limited liability and the spread of general incorporation 
laws. Limited liability weakened the aggregate view, and general incorporation 
weakened the artificial entity view. First, limited liability: As we have seen in 
England, limited liability did not exist for corporations until 1855.56 In the United 
States, however, most states adopted limited liability in the 1830s.57 In their first 
edition, Angell and Ames explain the primary distinction between a partnership 
and a corporation: 
In every private unincorporated company, the members are liable for 
the debts without limitation; whereas in incorporated societies, they 
are only liable to the extent of their shares . . . . It is frequently the 
principal object, in this and in other countries, in procuring an act of 
incorporation, to limit the risk of the partners to their shares in the 
stock of the association; and prudent men are always backward in 
taking stock, when they become mere copartners as regards their 
personal liability for the company debts.58 
56.Phillip I. Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge To Corporation Law 17 (1993). 
57.Id. at 10-12. 
58.ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 23; see also id., at 349 (“No rule of law, we believe, is better 
settled, than that, in general, the individual members of a private corporate body are not liable for 
the debts.”); id. at 36 (citing a quote from Judge Kent emphasizing limited liability as a reason to 
incorporate). 
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When Angell and Ames wrote this, limited liability was by no means a 
universally established rule for corporations;59 the authors were thus trying to 
establish the law as much as describe the law that existed. Their main argument, 
familiar from current debates on limited liability,60 was that “[t]he public, 
therefore, gain by acts incorporating trading associations, as by such means 
persons are induced to hazard a certain amount of property for the purposes of 
trade and public improvement, who would abstain from so doing, were not their 
liability thus limited.”61 
Eventually this argument won the day, and by 1840 most of the states had 
established limited liability.62  
Limited liability, in turn, led to a decline in the emphasis on the aggregate theory, 
because the aggregate view of corporations tended to reduce the distinction 
between the corporation and its members or shareholders, which is at the heart of 
limited liability.63 
The decline of the aggregate view can clearly be seen in two cases from 
the period of 1839 to 1844, in which the Supreme Court repudiated Marshall’s 
opinion in Deveaux. In Bank of Augusta v. Earle 64 the Court held that a 
corporation incorporated by Georgia could execute a valid contract in Alabama on 
comity grounds.65 However, the Court rejected the argument that Alabama was 
required to accept the contract on the basis that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause applied directly to the corporation’s members (as required by the aggregate 
 
59.BLUMBERG, supra note 56, at 10. 
60.See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets 
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital 
Markets Compel Limited Liability?: A Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427 
(1992); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (2002). 
61.ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 24; see also id. at 362 (arguing that states who pursue the 
contrary policy, like Massachusetts, “drive millions of capital into the neighboring states for 
investment”—an early instance of a “race” (to the top or bottom)). 
62.This was subject to one limitation, the “trust fund” doctrine, which said that the capital stock of 
a corporation was to be held in trust to pay corporate debts and thus could not be distributed to 
shareholders while debts were outstanding. See Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (D. Me. 1824). 
63.See generally Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for 
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003) (arguing that the 
main purpose of incorporation in the nineteenth century was to “lock in” capital in the firm 
because shareholders could not force distributions in exchange for limited liability); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 
393 (2000) (describing the “core defining characteristic of a legal entity” as the “partitioning off 
of a separate set of assets in which the creditors of the firm have a prior security interest”). 
64.38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). 
65.Id. at 585, 596. 
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view), stating that Deveaux had never been extended that far.66 Chief Justice 
Taney emphasized that he rejected the aggregate view because of its implications 
for limited liability, as well as the implications for state regulation of the 
corporations: 
The result of this [aggregate view] would be to make the corporation a 
mere partnership in business, in which each stockholder would be 
liable to the whole extent of his property for the debts of the 
corporation . . . . Besides, it would deprive every state of all control 
over the extent of corporate franchises proper to be granted in the State 
. . . .
67
 
In Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson,68 decided 
in 1844, the Court explicitly limited Deveaux to its facts, holding that diversity 
jurisdiction may arise even when some of the members of a defendant corporation 
are citizens of the same state as the plaintiff.69 The Court stated that the Deveaux
results “have never been satisfactory to the bar” and that a corporation “seems to 
us to be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that State 
[of incorporation], and therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, 
to be deemed a citizen of that State.”70 
This result was required by the proliferation of business corporations 
having many shareholders in many states, as opposed to the membership 
corporations of Marshall’s early days. As Angell and Ames state, by 1832 “[j]oint 
stock companies are composed of persons who seldom know any thing of the 
business of the company, but who leave the management of it entirely to the board 
of directors, and are contented with receiving such periodical dividends as the 
directors think proper to make.”71 The separation of management from ownership, 
and the rise of limited liability, rendered the aggregate view implausible.72 
66.Id. at 586-87. 
67.Id. 
68.43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). 
69.Id. at 554-55. 
70.Id. at 555. See also Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853) 
(holding that for diversity purposes a corporation should be deemed a resident of its place of 
incorporation). This led to the current rule, adopted in 1958, under which a corporation is for 
diversity purposes a citizen of both the state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it 
has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006). 
71.ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 32 (emphasis omitted). 
72.See Chief Justice Shaw’s statement: 
A board of directors of the banks of Massachusetts is a body recognized by law. By the by-laws 
of these corporations, and by a usage, so general and uniform as to be regarded as part of the law 
of the land, they have the general superintendence and active management of all the concerns of 
the bank, and constitute, to all purposes of dealing with others, the corporation.”  
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Second, general incorporation: In the 1820s and 1830s the granting of 
corporate charters by state legislatures became a process fraught with corruption.73 
Some Jacksonians reacted by advocating elimination of the rights of states to grant 
corporate charters.74 But the corporate form was so widely used that this was 
impracticable; instead, laws were passed in all the states permitting anyone to 
form a corporation on payment of a fee without permission by the state 
legislature.75 This democratizing move meant that the artificial entity theory, under 
which the corporation derives its powers from the state, lost most of its appeal, 
since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations. Instead, 
corporations were viewed as separate from both their shareholders and the state, 
and the real entity view reigned supreme.76 
 
1.2. From Closely Held to Widely Held Corporations 
 
The situation between the 1820s and the end of the Civil War was thus the 
proliferation of for-profit corporations, incorporated under general incorporation 
 
Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 163, 166-67 (1840) (emphasis added). It is hard to 
imagine a clearer rejection of the aggregate view. See also Hoyt v. Thompson’s Executor, in 
which the New York Court of Appeals held  
[I]n corporate bodies the powers of the board of directors are, in a very important sense, original 
and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor can they revoke those powers. They are 
derivative only in the sense of being received from the State in the act of incorporation. The 
directors convened as a board are the primary possessors of all the powers which the charter 
confers, and like private principals they may delegate to agents of their own appointment the 
performance of any acts which they themselves can perform. The recognition of this principle is 
absolutely necessary in the affairs of every corporation whose powers are vested in a board of 
directors. Without it the most ordinary business could not be carried on, and the corporate 
powers could not be executed.  
19 N.Y. (5 Smith) 207, 216 (1859). This constitutes a recognition that the aggregate view derived 
from the membership corporation could not be maintained as a practical matter in corporations 
with hundreds or thousands of shareholders, as already existed in the 1850s. 
73.See Angell & Ames, supra note 7, at 35-36; James W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business 
Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970, at 33-36 (1970); Marvin Meyers, The 
Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief 201 (1957). 
74.Hurst, supra note 73, at ___; Meyers, supra note 73, at ___. 
75.See, e.g., Act Relating to Joint Stock Corporations, 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49, 49 (permitting 
incorporation of any “lawful” business); Nesmith v. Sheldon, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 812, 817-18 
(1849); see also President Jackson’s veto of the second bank of the United States: “[i]f [the 
government] would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its 
favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing,” 
Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in 2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 576, 590 (1896). 
76. The same result was obtained in England by the adoption of the Joint Stock Companies Act, 
1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47 (U.K.). 
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laws with minimal interference by the state and with shareholders who enjoyed 
limited liability. Those shareholders were, however, relatively few in number; 
despite the Angell and Ames quotation above,77 few corporations before 1865 
required massive amounts of capital, and most were small, closely held 
enterprises.78 This enabled the Civil War income tax on corporate income to be 
imposed directly on the shareholders of corporations.79 
This state of affairs began to change with the advent of the railroads, 
followed by the steel and oil companies. With the rise of large corporate 
enterprises, massive amounts of capital were required, and between 1865 and the 
1890s the widely held, publicly traded, non-owner managed enterprise gradually 
became the norm for U.S. business activities.80 This was followed from 1890 to 
1906 by a wave of consolidation that left several important business areas 
dominated by monopolies run by the Robber Barons.81 
The shift from small, closely held enterprises to massive, publicly held 
ones once again necessitated a re-examination of the corporate form, and again all 
three theories of the corporation appear. A classic example of the aggregate view 
is Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,82 ultimately decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1886. This case is famous for Chief Justice Waite’s 
statement that “[t]he court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether 
the [Equal Protection Clause] . . . applies to these corporations. We are all of the 
opinion that it does.”83 Some scholars identified this as an application of the real 
entity view to corporations,84 but Professor Horwitz has shown, by examining 
Justice Field’s opinion in the court below, that it actually represented an 
application of the aggregate view.85 Specifically, Field held that the Equal 
Protection Clause must apply to corporations for the following reasons: 
[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of individuals united 
for some lawful purpose, and permitted to use a common name in their 
business and have succession of membership without dissolution . . . . 
But the members do not, because of such association, lose their right 
to protection, and equality of protection. . . .  
77. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
78.Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax”, 
90 Va. L. Rev. 1193, 1213 (2004) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Corporations]. 
79.Id. 
80.Id. at 1227, 1232. 
81.Id. at 1227. 
82.118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
83.Id. at 396. See Morton J. Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate 
Theory”, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 173-74 (1985). 
84.Horwitz, supra note 82, at 178. 
85.Id. at 174, 177-78, 223. 
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 Whatever affects the property of the corporation—that is, of all the 
members united by the common name—necessarily affects their 
interests. . . . So, therefore, whenever a provision of the constitution or 
of a law guaranties to persons protection in their property . . . the 
benefits of the provision . . . are extended to corporations; not to the 
name under which different persons are united, but to the individuals 
composing the union. The courts will always look through the name to 
see and protect those whom the name represents.86 
 
A clearer statement of the aggregate view can hardly be imagined; most 
remarkable is Field’s reliance on Deveaux despite the fact that the Supreme Court 
overturned its results forty years earlier.87 Similarly, in Pembina Mining Co. v. 
Pennsylvania,88 decided two years later, Justice Field stated that, “[u]nder the 
designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such 
corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose.”89 
However, the artificial entity view was also raised in these cases. In Santa 
Clara, the railroad corporations made the argument that because they were 
operating under special congressional legislation, they should be regarded as an 
extension of the federal government and therefore California could not tax them.90 
Field rejected this view (citing Dartmouth College), but noted that “when the 
instrumentality is the creation of the state,—a corporation formed under its 
laws,—and is employed or adopted by the general government for its convenience 
. . . it remains subject to the taxing power of the state.”91 And notably, in Pembina, 
Field followed Taney in rejecting the argument that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause applied to corporations because they were not “citizens,” even though the 
aggregate view he adopted in Santa Clara might have led to the contrary 
position.92 Instead, Field emphasized the relationship between the corporation and 
the incorporating state under the artificial entity view: 
 
[T]he term citizens, as used in the clause, applies only to natural 
persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance to the State, not 
to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only 
such attributes as the legislature has prescribed . . . a grant of corporate 
existence was a grant of special privileges to the corporators, enabling 
them to act for certain specified purposes as a single individual, and 
 
86.Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402-03 (D. Cal. 1883). 
87.Id. at 403. 
88.Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888). 
89.Id. at 189. See also Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50, 59 (1890) (“We do not see that 
the rights of the parties in regard to the assets of this corporation differ from those of a 
partnership on its dissolution.”). 
90.Santa Clara, 18 F. at 387. 
91.Id. at 389. 
92.Pembina, 125 U.S. at 187. 
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exempting them, unless otherwise provided, from individual 
liability.93 
Moreover, all three views of the corporation appear in Hale v. Henkel,94
decided by the Supreme Court in 1906. The issue was whether an agent of a 
corporation could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination or the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search 
and seizure in the name of the corporation.95 On the Fifth Amendment issue, the 
Court held that the right against self-incrimination did not apply to corporations: 
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to 
incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness . . . . 
The question whether a corporation is a “person” within the meaning 
of this Amendment really does not arise . . . since it can only be heard 
by oral evidence in the person of some one of its agents or employés.96 
This is closest to the real entity view, since it rejects (like Marshall in 
Dandridge) the aggregate position of looking through a corporation to its 
shareholders and takes into account the special characteristics of the corporation 
itself. 
On the other hand, regarding the Fourth Amendment question, the Court at 
first emphasized the artificial entity view, using it to justify regulation by the state: 
Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation under 
investigation, and that he was entitled to assert the rights of the 
corporation with respect to the production of its books and papers, we 
are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular 
between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no 
right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the 
suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional 
rights as a citizen. . . .  
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is 
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives 
certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the 
laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are 
limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. 
Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it 
obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the 
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has 
exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a 
State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, 
93.Id. at 187-88. 
94. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
95.Id. at 51. 
96.Id. at 69-70.  
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could not in the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these 
franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and 
demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that 
purpose . . . . While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer 
incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it 
does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and 
franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of 
such privileges.97 
 
However, having clearly stated its reasons for limiting the application of 
the constitutional right, the Court suddenly reverted back to the aggregate view 
when faced with the question of whether corporations have any Fourth 
Amendment rights at all: 
 
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not 
entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an 
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct 
legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no 
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot 
be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by 
due process of law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, against unlawful discrimination. Corporations are a 
necessary feature of modern business activity, and their aggregated 
capital has become the source of nearly all great enterprises.98 
 
What can explain this remarkable oscillation between the three views? The 
key is the last sentence quoted. As noted above, the period between 1890 and 
1906 marked the height of the debate on the rise of the great corporations. The 
Court is trying to strike a balance between the rights of the corporations, which 
 
97.Id. at 74-75. Remarkably, the court applied this analysis to give powers to the federal 
government over state corporations: 
 It is true that the corporation in this case was chartered under the laws of New Jersey, and that it 
receives its franchise from the legislature of that State; but such franchises, so far as they involve 
questions of interstate commerce, must also be exercised in subordination to the power of 
Congress to regulate such commerce, and in respect to this the General Government may also 
assert a sovereign authority to ascertain whether such franchises have been exercised in a lawful 
manner, with a due regard to its own laws. Being subject to this dual sovereignty, the General 
Government possesses the same right to see that its own laws are respected as the State would 
have with respect to the special franchises vested in it by the laws of the State. The powers of the 
General Government in this particular in the vindication of its own laws, are the same as if the 
corporation had been created by an act of Congress. It is not intended to intimate, however, that it 
has a general visitatorial power over state corporations.  
Id. at 75. This issue came up in the corporate tax debate as well. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, supra 
note 78, at 1214-19. 
98.Hale, 201 U.S. at 76 (emphasis removed) (citation omitted). 
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can best be protected under either the aggregate or the real entity views, and the 
regulatory power of the state, which is best reflected in the artificial entity view. 
On the one hand, as the Court states, “[c]orporations are a necessary feature of 
modern business activity” and must be protected.99 On the other hand, the right of 
the state to regulate must also be preserved, especially since the context of Hale 
was an antitrust investigation into two major corporations, the American Tobacco 
Company and McAndrews & Forbes Inc. 
Ultimately, however, the real entity view prevailed.100 This first involved 
the rejection of the aggregate view. For example, in Western Turf Ass’n v. 
Greenberg,101 decided just one year after Hale, Justice Harlan emphasized that a 
corporation is a separate entity from its shareholders, and therefore it is not a 
“citizen” for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause or entitled to the 
protection of the due process clause: “the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of 
natural, not artificial, persons.”102 But by itself this position would have led to too 
much state regulation for the Lochner Court. Thus, in Southern Railway Co. v. 
Greene,103 decided in 1909, the Court came out clearly for the position that the 
corporation as such was entitled to constitutional protection under the Equal 
Protection Clause, without any reference to its shareholders: “the corporation . . . 
is within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a person within the 
jurisdiction of the State of Alabama, and entitled to be protected against any 
statute of the State which deprives it of the equal protection of the laws.”104 
Once again, the triumph of the real entity view can be explained by several 
factors. The aggregate view was raised by Field and others to protect the rights of 
corporations, but it was even more incongruous in the context of the mega-
99.Id. 
100.This view was also reflected in contemporary books and law review articles. See, e.g., ERNST 
FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 81-83 (1897); George F. Deiser, The Juristic 
Person, 57 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 131, 131-133 (1908); Harold J. Laski, The Personality 
of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 413 (1916); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate 
Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 261-62 (1911); I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of 
Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 516 (1912) (all rejecting the aggregate view). But see 
VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN 
CHARITABLE 2 (1882) (supporting the aggregate view, stating that “the existence of a corporation 
independently of its shareholders is a fiction”). 
101.204 U.S. 359 (1907). 
102.Id. at 363. 
103.216 U.S. 400 (1910). 
104.Id. at 417. Remarkably this case involves a discriminatory state tax similar to the one struck 
down by Field on aggregate grounds in W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 36 (1910); 
Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 64 (1910) (White, J., concurring) See also Ludwig v. W. 
Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 157 (1910) (eliminating the restrictions imposed by Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839)); see also, Horwitz, supra note 82. 
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corporations of the 1890s, with thousands of shareholders, than in the pre–Civil 
War days. It also gave the corporation too many rights vis-a-vis the state, as seen 
in Hale and in Greenberg. The artificial entity view gave the state too much power 
to regulate corporations, as the Hale court came to realize when it laid out its 
implications. The real entity view was most congruent with business realities as 
well as the one most suited to a corporation-state balance. By 1909, it was well 
established as the dominant view of the corporation, as reflected in contemporary 
debates surrounding the enactment of the corporate tax.105 
The rise of the real entity view is also reflected in two other contemporary 
developments: the rise of the business judgment rule and the decline of the ultra 
vires doctrine.106 The business judgment rule rejected the aggregate view in 
holding that the board of directors possessed powers that were not delegated from 
the shareholders and that shareholders could not normally call into question the 
exercise of those powers. The ultra vires doctrine represented the ability of the 
state to require corporations to adhere to their charter, and was thus based on the 
artificial entity view; its decline thus reinforced the rejection of that view. 
The first full statement of the business judgment rule was made in Leslie v. 
Lorillard,107 decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888. The court held 
 
In actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their directors or 
trustees, courts will not interfere unless the powers have been illegally 
or unconscientiously executed . . . . Mere errors of judgment are not 
 
105.See Avi-Yonah, Corporations, supra note 78. 
106.Another related development was the strengthening of limited liability resulting from the 
demise of the “trust fund” doctrine, which held that the capital stock of a corporation must be 
held in trust for the benefit of its creditors. This doctrine, which originated from Justice Story’s 
opinion in Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-37 (D. Me. 1824), was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. 610, 623 (1873), on the basis of the aggregate view (“after all, 
this artificial body is but the representative of its stockholders, and exists mainly for their benefit, 
and is governed and controlled by them through the officers whom they elect”). See also 
WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS 322 (New York 
City, Baker, Voorhis & Co., Law Publishers 1887) [hereinafter COOK, LAW OF STOCK AND 
STOCKHOLDERS]. However, in 1892 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held in Hospes v. 
Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co. 
 This trust-fund doctrine . . . . is not sufficiently precise or accurate to constitute a safe foundation 
upon which to build a system of legal rules . . . . Corporate property is not held in trust . . . . 
Absolute control and power of disposition are inconsistent with the idea of a trust. The capital of 
a corporation is its property . . . . [A] corporation is in law as distinct a being as an individual is, 
and is entitled to hold property (if not contrary to its charter) as absolutely as an individual can 
hold it.  
48 Minn. 174, 192-193 (1892). The doctrine then fell into desuetude, reinforced by the invention 
of no par stock in the early twentieth century. See Horwitz, supra note 82, at 207-14. 
107.110 N.Y. 519, 532 (1888). 
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sufficient as grounds for equity interference; for the powers entrusted 
with corporate management are largely discretionary.108 
A year later the same court expanded this statement 
All powers directly conferred by statute, or impliedly granted, of 
necessity, must be exercised by the directors who are constituted by 
the law as the agency for the doing of corporate acts. The expression 
of the corporate will and the performance of corporate functions, in the 
management of a corporation, may originate with its directors . . . . 
Within the chartered authority they have the fullest power to regulate 
the concerns of a corporation, according to their best judgment . . . . In 
the management of the affairs of the corporation, they are dependent 
solely upon their own knowledge of its business and their own 
judgment as to what its interests require.109 
This rule became well established, so that by 1905 a court could write that 
“it is [the board’s] judgment, and not that of its stockholders outside of the board 
of directors . . . that is to shape [a corporation’s] policies or decide upon its 
corporate acts. This principle is not disputed, and the citation of authorities in its 
support is unnecessary.”110 The rule reflected the real entity view, which equates 
the corporation with its management, and rejected the view of the corporation as 
an aggregate of its shareholders.111 
The one potential limitation on the power of the board was the ultra vires 
doctrine, which held that a board could not act contrary to the powers conferred on 
it by the state. The ultra vires doctrine thus represented the artificial entity view. 
The doctrine originated in the pre- Civil War Era,112 but became prominent in the 
arguments on the relationship of the state and the corporation in the 1880s and 
1890s.113 The artificial entity argument for upholding the limitation was stated 
clearly by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888: 
In the granting of charters the legislature is presumed to have had in 
view the public interest; and public policy is (as the interests of 
108.Id. 
109.Beveridge v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 112 N.Y. 1, 22 (1889). 
110.Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 140 F. 117, 118 (D.N.J. 1905); see also Manson v. Curtis, 223 
N.Y. 313, 323 (1918) (“Directors are the exclusive, executive representatives of the corporation 
and are charged with the administration of its internal affairs and the management and use of its 
assets. Clearly the law does not permit the stockholders to create a sterilized board of directors.” 
(citation omitted)). 
111.It also represented a transition from an agency to a trustee model of the relationship between 
shareholders and management. See Millon, supra note 10. 
112.See, e.g., Abbott v. Am. Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861). 
113.See generally COOK, LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, supra note 105, at chs. 19, 38. 
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stockholders ought to be) concerned in the restriction of corporations 
within chartered limits, and a departure therefrom is only deemed 
excusable when it cannot result in prejudice to the public or to the 
stockholders. As artificial creations, they have no powers or faculties, 
except those with which they were endowed when created . . . .114 
. . . . 
. . . Corporations are great engines for the promotion of the public 
convenience, and for the development of public wealth, and, so long 
as they are conducted for the purposes for which organized, they are a 
public benefit; but if allowed to engage, without supervision, in 
subjects of enterprise foreign to their charters, or if permitted 
unrestrainedly to control and monopolize the avenues to that industry 
in which they are engaged, they become a public menace; against 
which public policy and statutes design protection.115 
 
The artificial entity doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court the 
following year:  
 
 It may be considered as the established doctrine of this court in regard 
to the powers of corporations, that they are such and such only as are 
conferred upon them by the acts of the legislatures of the several 
States under which they are organized. A corporation in this country, 
whatever it may have been in England at a time when the crown 
exercised the right of creating such bodies, can only have an existence 
under the express law of the State or sovereignty by which it is 
created. And these powers, where they do not relate to municipal 
corporations exercising authority conferred solely for the benefit of the 
public, and in some sense parts of the body politic of the State, have in 
this country until within recent years always been conferred by special 
acts of the legislative body under which they claim to exist. But the 
rapid growth of corporations, which have come to take a part in all or 
nearly all of the business operations of the country, and especially in 
enterprises requiring large aggregations of capital and individual 
energy, as well as their success in meeting the needs of a vast number 
of most important commercial relations, have demanded the serious 
attention and consideration of law makers. And while valuable 
services have been rendered to the public by this class of 
organizations, which have stimulated their formation by numerous 
special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they were attended by 
many evils in their operation as well as much good, and that the hasty 
manner in which they were created by the legislatures, sometimes with 
exclusive privileges, often without due consideration and under the 
influence of improper motives, frequently led to bad results.116 
 
 
114.Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519, 531. 
115.Id. at 533. 
116.Oregon Ry & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Ry, 130 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1889). 
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The reference to corporate abuses relates to the rise of trusts, and indeed 
the ultra vires doctrine was used to dissolve sugar and oil trusts under New York 
and Ohio law.117 However, in 1895 the Supreme Court rejected an antitrust 
challenge to the sugar trust on the grounds that the Sherman Act applied only to 
corporations engaged directly in interstate commerce.118 And in 1896 the Court 
rejected an ultra vires challenge on the ability of the Union Pacific Railway to 
lease its tracks for 999 years to another railroad, when the charter would not 
permit an outright sale.119 This literal decision significantly reduced the power of 
the ultra vires doctrine.120 
The ultimate demise of the doctrine resulted not from a court decision but 
from the competition among states to attract corporate charters, which was begun 
by New Jersey in 1890 and continued by Delaware in the 1900s.121 This 
competition meant that New Jersey and Delaware had every incentive to relax any 
limiting elements in their charters that restricted the power of corporate 
management.122 Thus, for example, the long-lasting prohibition against 
corporations owning stock in other corporations, which led to the necessity of 
“trusts,” was eliminated by New Jersey in its 1896 law.123 As a result, although the 
Supreme Court still held in 1899 that such a combination was ultra vires under 
117.See People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582 (1890); State, ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 
49 Ohio St. 137, 184-85 (1892); see also WILLIAM COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM 225 
(1891); Theodore Dwight, The Legality of Trusts, 3 POLI. SCI. Q. 592 (1888). 
118.United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895). 
119.Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 163 U.S. 564, 585 (1896). 
120.See 2 William W. Cook, A Treatise on Stock and Stockholders, Bonds, Mortgages, and 
General Corporation Law 971, 971-72 (3d ed. 1894) [hereinafter 2 Cook, Stock and 
Stockholders] (“The courts are becoming more liberal, and many acts which fifty years ago 
would have been held to be ultra vires would now be held to be intra vires.”). By 1898 Cook 
wrote that “the doctrine of ultra vires is disappearing.” 1 William W. Cook, A Treatise on the 
Law of Corporations Having a Capital Stock, at vii (4th ed. 1898) [hereinafter 1 Cook, 
Corporations]. See also Horwitz, supra note 82, at 186-88 (discussing this development). 
121.See RUSSEL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 1-26 (1937); Edward Q. 
Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L. REV. 198, 201 (1899); Lincoln 
Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, 25 MCLURE’S MAGAZINE 41 (1905). On the “race to the 
bottom/race to the top” debate, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the 
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1435, 1444-46 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm 
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 526-28 (2001); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58 (1977). 
122.See New Jersey Legislating for the United States, INDIANAPOLIS J. (Nov. 11, 1901); James B. 
Dill, Address Before the Merchants’ Club of Chicago, Illinois: Trusts: Their Uses and Abuses 
(Nov. 9, 1901). 
123.General Corporation Act of New Jersey, N.J. Comp. Stat. § 51 (1896); see also id. § 104 
(authorizing mergers); 1 COOK, CORPORATIONS, supra note 120, at vi. 
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New York law, this holding became rather meaningless since most large, publicly 
traded corporations were incorporated in New Jersey.124 As the New Jersey statute 
explains, “[i]t was formerly the rule in this State that acts of a corporation in 
excess of its express powers, or those necessarily implied, were void, and 
contracts which were ultra vires the corporation were incapable of enforcement or 
ratification. . . . This rule no longer obtains.”125 
The decline of the ultra vires doctrine was sealed by the spread of 
corporate laws permitting incorporation for “any lawful activity.”126 With the 
doctrine gone, the artificial entity view of the corporation became less plausible, 
and the real entity view reigned supreme again.127 
 
1.3. The Hostile Takeover Crisis 
 
In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal in which he 
dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and real 
entity views of the corporation.128 These views, he explains, could be deployed to 
suit any purpose; and he uses examples relying on the cyclical nature of these 
theories.129 His conclusion is that theory should be abandoned for an examination 
of reality.130 
Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on corporate 
personality largely disappeared until the 1970s. As a practical matter, however, 
the real entity view predominated for large, publicly traded corporations. The 
board ran the corporation as it saw fit, protected from the shareholders by the 
separation of ownership from management noted by Berle and Means in the 
1930s131 and by the business judgment rule. The board was also protected from the 
 
124.De la Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U.S. 40, 52 (1899). 
125.James B. Dill, The General Corporation Act of New Jersey 11 (1903). 
126.Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires—Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires 
Acts of Business Corporations, 9 J. CORP. L. 81, 89 (1983). 
127.See Machen, supra note 99, at 260-61. Another significant development in this period was 
states passing statutes that allowed a majority of shareholders to sell corporate assets (before the 
1890s, shareholder unanimity was required). This greatly facilitated mergers and also represented 
the decline of the aggregate view. See Horwitz, supra note 82, at 200-02. 
128.John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 
673 (1926). 
129.Id. at 669. 
130.Id. at 673. 
131.Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 4-5 
(1932). 
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state by the relaxation of corporate law limits begun by New Jersey and continued 
by Delaware.132 
The next significant practical change in this state of affairs only arose in 
the 1980s. As a result of the invention of the junk bond market, it suddenly 
became possible for hostile raiders to threaten takeovers of even the largest 
corporations. After RJR Nabisco was taken private for $25 billion in 1988,133 it 
was clear that no board was safe. As a result, debates on the nature of the 
corporation and its relationship to the shareholders and the state, which began in 
the academic literature in the 1970s, once again became a matter of practical 
concern. And once again all three theories of the corporation reappeared, as can be 
seen if one examines three seminal cases decided between 1982 and 1989 by the 
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Delaware. 
Edgar v. MITE Corp.,134 decided by the Supreme Court in 1982, involved 
the constitutionality of an anti-takeover act enacted by the state of Illinois.135
Under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, a hostile tender offer for the shares of 
a company covered by the act had to be registered by the Secretary of State, and 
the offeror had to give both the target and the state a twenty-day notice during 
which only the target could communicate with its shareholders regarding the 
offer.136 The act applied both to corporations in which 10 percent of the 
shareholders were residents of Illinois and to corporations that were either 
incorporated in the state or had their principal office in it.137 The MITE 
corporation made a hostile offer for an Illinois corporation and refused to comply 
with the act, arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause.138 
The Supreme Court agreed with MITE. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice 
White held that the Illinois act was unconstitutional because it could apply to 
tender offers that did not affect a single Illinois shareholder, specifically, that “the 
State has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders.”139 
132.This state of affairs prompted Adolph Berle, the prime intellect behind the shareholder primacy 
doctrine in the 1930s, to concede defeat in 1956: 
Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E. Merrick Dodd, of 
Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate powers were powers in trust for 
shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that these powers were held in trust for the entire 
community. The argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of 
Professor Dodd’s contention.  
See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution 169 (1954). 
133.Bryan Burrough & John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco (1990) 
(describing the $25 billion leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco). 
134.457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
135.Id. at 626. 
136.Id. at 634-35. 
137.Id. at 627. 
138.Id. at 627-28. 
139.Id. at 644. 
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Moreover, the fact that the target corporation was an Illinois corporation was 
irrelevant since state regulation only applied to the corporation’s internal affairs: 
“[t]ender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and 
do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company.”140 Instead, 
the focus should be entirely on the impact of blocking the tender offer on the 
company’s shareholders and their relationship with management: 
 
 The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a 
nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of 
the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The reallocation of 
economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which can 
improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the 
tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform 
well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.141 
This part of the opinion clearly reflects the aggregate view. The focus is 
entirely on the impact on the corporation’s shareholders, and the corporation itself 
(including its management) barely exists—as indicated by the statement that a 
change in corporate control has no relevance to the internal affairs of the 
corporation. The market for corporate control is praised because of its ability to 
overcome the agency cost problem and the incentive it provides for management 
to maximize stock prices. Moreover, White quotes the work of Easterbrook and 
Fischel, who are among the principal proponents of the “nexus of contracts” 
theory of the corporation, according to which the corporation is merely a 
convenient legal term for a series of contracts, the most important of which is the 
contract between shareholders and management.142 
This part of the opinion, which rejects both the artificial entity and the real 
entity theories, evoked some misgivings on the part of Justice Powell, even though 
he joined to provide the crucial fifth vote.143 Powell noted that in some cases the 
state may have a legitimate interest because the corporation has a real presence 
that goes beyond a contract between management and the shareholders, reflecting 
both the artificial and real entity views: 
 
140.Id. at 645. 
141.Id. at 643-44 (citations omitted). 
142.See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 1273 (1982) (“A corporation . . . is 
nothing more than a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various 
individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual benefit.”). The point that the nexus of 
contracts theory is a reinvention of the aggregate view has been made repeatedly. See, e.g., 
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1478-79 (1989); Millon, supra note 10, at 229. 
143.Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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I join Part V-B because its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some 
room for state regulation of tender offers. This period in our history is 
marked by conglomerate corporate formations essentially unrestricted 
by the antitrust laws. Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms of 
professional personnel experienced in takeovers as well as of capital, 
that vastly exceed those of the takeover target. This disparity in 
resources may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional 
target corporation. Inevitably there are certain adverse consequences 
in terms of general public interest when corporate headquarters are 
moved away from a city and State.* 
* The corporate headquarters of the great national and 
multinational corporations tend to be located in the large cities 
of a few States. When corporate headquarters are transferred 
out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, 
the State and locality from which the transfer is made 
inevitably suffer significantly. Management personnel—many 
of whom have provided community leadership—may move to 
the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, 
charitable, and educational life—both in terms of leadership 
and financial support—also tend to diminish when there is a 
move of corporate headquarters.144 
Five years later Powell had the opportunity to translate these misgivings 
into an opinion for the Court that emphasized instead the artificial entity view of 
the corporation. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America145 involved a so-called 
“second generation” anti-takeover statute, i.e., one that was drafted to get around 
the problems with the Illinois statute struck down in MITE.146 The Indiana statute 
applied only to corporations incorporated in Indiana, which have specified levels 
of shareholders within the state and which opt for its protection.147 Under the 
statute, an acquirer who acquired “control shares” in such an Indiana target could 
vote them only with the approval of a majority of the pre-existing disinterested 
shareholders, to be obtained in a meeting within fifty days of the acquisition.148 
The Court of Appeals followed MITE and declared the statute 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, because it interfered with the 
market for corporate control: 
Even if a corporation’s tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency 
with which they are employed and the proportions in which the 
earnings they generate are divided between management and 
144.Id. 
145.481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
146.Id. 
147.Id. at 72-73. 
148.Id. at 73-75. 
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shareholders depends on the market for corporate control—an 
interstate, indeed international, market that the State of Indiana is not 
authorized to opt out of . . . .149
 
The Supreme Court reversed.150 Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority, 
stated 
 
No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly 
established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations, 
including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders . . . .  
. . . We think the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance 
for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of 
corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence 
and attributes are a product of state law. As Chief Justice Marshall 
explained: 
“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature 
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of 
its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to 
its very existence. These are such as are supposed best 
calculated to effect the object for which it was created.”151 
 
Powell thus rejected the view that states do not have the right to regulate 
transactions affecting shareholders, including shareholders in other states. He 
argued that the “free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a 
corporation . . . is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single 
jurisdiction. . . . A State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among 
parties involved in the corporations it charters.”152 And he explicitly rejected the 
market for corporate control, and its underlying aggregate theory: 
 
The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any 
particular economic theory. . . . 153 
. . . [T]here is no reason to assume that the type of 
conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive 
takeovers will result in more effective management or 
otherwise be beneficial to shareholders. . . . 154 
 
149.Id. at 77 (quoting Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir. 
1986)). 
150.CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. at 89. 
151.Id. (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)). 
152.Id. at 90-91. 
153.Id. at 92. 
154.Id. at 92, n.13 
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. . . [T]he very commodity that is traded in the “market for corporate 
control”—the corporation—is one that owes its existence and 
attributes to state law.155
This entire opinion, with its quotation from Dartmouth College, is clearly 
based on the artificial entity view that the corporation owes its existence to the 
incorporating state and that the state may therefore regulate it, including in ways 
that affect shareholders’ ability to sell their shares. Not surprisingly, Justice White 
dissented, arguing that while the statute may help Indiana corporations, 
“particularly in helping those corporations maintain the status quo,”156 it is 
inimical to the interests of the shareholders and constitutes “economic 
protectionism.”157 
After CTS, the battle for corporate control moved to state law, and the 
most important state in this regard was Delaware—the state in which most major 
U.S. corporations are incorporated. Delaware law was favorable to hostile 
takeovers until 1989, when the Supreme Court of Delaware issued an opinion in 
Paramount v. Time ,  I nc . 158 that, in practice, ended the hostile takeover boom.159
Paramount had made $175 (later raised to $200) per share offer (for Time) when 
Time was about to enter into a $70 per share merger with Warner.160 Paramount 
argued that under the previous decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.161 and Revelon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc.,162 Time was “up for sale,” and therefore, the business 
judgment rule was suspended and Time’s board was required to maximize 
shareholder value by accepting the much higher Paramount bid.163 
The Delaware Supreme Court held in favor of Time. It stated 
Two key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware law 
imposes on a board of directors the duty to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation. This broad mandate includes a conferred 
authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, 
designed to enhance corporate profitability. Thus, the question of 
“long-term” versus “short-term” values is largely irrelevant because 
directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation 
which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment 
horizon. Second, absent a limited set of circumstances as defined 
155.Id. at 94. 
156.Id. at 98. 
157.Id. at 100. 
158.571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
159.See id. at 1155. 
160.Id. at 1147-49. 
161.493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
162.506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
163.Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1142. 
28
Accounting, Economics, and Law, Vol. 1 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 1
DOI: 10.2202/2152-2820.1048
Brought to you by | University of Michigan Law School
Authenticated | 141.211.57.157
Download Date | 1/17/14 9:17 PM
under Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act in an 
informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize 
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a 
takeover.164 
 
The court thus rejected the view that maximizing short-term shareholder 
value was always required. Instead, the board was permitted to pursue its view of 
the best long-term corporate strategy: 
 
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to 
the stockholders’ duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary 
duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time 
frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be 
delegated to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to abandon a 
deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder 
profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate 
strategy.165 
 
Thus, the board was permitted to prefer preservation of the “Time 
culture”—its stated goal over maximizing the cash return to shareholders. This 
effectively killed the takeover threat, because any board could find good long-
term share-value maximization reasons to reject a superior cash bid. The Delaware 
court, thus enhancing managerial power, in effect endorsed the real entity view: a 
corporation was an entity with its own corporate culture, which should not be 
subordinated to the shareholders or to the state. This view was ratified when the 
ALI corporate governance project adopted a rule that corporate boards may take 
into account the interests of other “stakeholders,” not just the shareholders.166 
Why did the real entity view prevail? The obvious answer was that 
corporate management determines the state of incorporation, and therefore the 
Delaware Supreme Court felt that it had to side with management once the U.S. 
Supreme Court had approved the anti-takeover laws of other states, lest 
corporations choose to relocate there. However, it seems unlikely that this was the 
only reason; Delaware is very well established as the preferred state of 
incorporation,167 and stock values would likely decrease if shareholders perceive 
that management was leaving Delaware just to protect itself. Instead, it seems 
likely that the Delaware Supreme Court genuinely believed that a corporation like 
Time had a corporate existence and culture with implications for other 
 
164.Id. at 1150 (citation omitted). 
165.Id. at 1154 (citations omitted). 
166.1 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.01(b)(3) illus. i. 
(1994). 
167.Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 
757, 842-45 (1995). 
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stakeholders, and therefore rejected the aggregate view equating the corporation 
with its shareholders. In that way, its concerns were similar to those raised by 
Justice Powell in his concurrence in MITE: a corporation is more than a “nexus of 
contracts,” and courts and legislatures are allowed to take the interests of other 
stakeholders into account.168
1.4. From National Corporations to Multinational 
Enterprises 
The last transformation in the nature of the corporation began in the 1950s and is 
still on-going, so that its ultimate outcome is hard to judge. This is the 
transformation from corporations based mostly in one country to multinational 
enterprises based in many countries. 
Multinationals, in the sense of corporations owning assets overseas, have 
existed since the seventeenth century.169 However, as recently as the 1950s, the 
shareholders (and other sources of capital), the management, most of the 
production facilities, and most of the markets of even large multinationals tended 
to be in one country, so that, essentially, what was good for G.M. was good for 
America.170  
Since the 1990s, however, this has changed profoundly.171 As more 
countries opened up to foreign direct investment, communications improved, and 
many products became lighter and easier to ship, more and more corporations 
became “globalized.” In a globalized multinational, the sources of capital are in 
many countries. The shares of large multinationals trade on as many as twenty 
exchanges, and borrowing facilities are similarly diversified. Research and 
development and production facilities are likewise spread around the globe, as are 
markets. The only thing that usually ties a modern multinational to its home 
country is the location of management.172 
In this context, the debate over the nature of the corporation has re-opened. 
There is abundant academic writing on the relationship between multinationals 
and the state, and most writers from both left and right concede that this 
relationship has changed profoundly so that the home state—the state of 
incorporation—has become powerless to control “its” multinationals; it is hard 
168.See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
169.See Harris, supra note 20, at 39-59. 
170.Robert Reich, Who is US? 90 Harv. Bus. Rev. 53, 54 (1990). 
171.Id. 
172.Id. at 53-54. 
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even to identify to which country multinationals “belong.”173 On a practical level 
this situation has led to attempts by home states to control the behavior of 
multinationals abroad in areas as diverse as trading with the enemy, antitrust, 
corruption and others, with varying success.174 The most recent development in 
this regard is “inversion” transactions, in which the management changes the 
country of incorporation of a multinational’s parent corporation.175 These 
transactions are undertaken primarily for tax reasons, but they have corporate 
governance implications as well.176 Specifically, the artificial entity theory 
becomes hard to maintain when management can pick weak countries like 
Bermuda as the country of incorporation for the parent of a multinational. 
The relationship with shareholders has also undergone changes as 
shareholders now tend to come from many countries. One implication of this has 
been that the securities laws of the weakest country tend to dominate because of 
cross-country price arbitrage.177 Another implication is academic proposals to let 
management choose the country of securities law as well as the country of 
incorporation.178 On a practical level, globalization has led the SEC to relax 
requirements for some foreign issuers.179 This trend has tended to weaken the 
applicability of the aggregate view as well. It is hard to predict where these trends 
will lead, but at the moment they appear once more to favor the real entity view. 
 
 
173.Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 86-93 
(3d ed. 1995); Reich, supra note 172. But see Laura D’Andrea Tyson, They Are Not Us: Why 
American Ownership Still Matters, Am. Prospect, Winter 1991, at 37-38. 
174.See Raymond Vernon, In the Hurricane’s Eye: The Troubled Prospects of Multinational 
Enterprises 30-51 (1998); see also Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 
114-17, 385 (2d ed. 2007); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational 
Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 16-20 (2003) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, National Regulation]; Blumberg, supra note 
56, at 169. 
175. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 95 Tax 
Notes 1793, 1793-94 (2002) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake]. 
176.Id. at 1794. For the congressional response, see I.R.C. § 7874 (2005). 
177.See Amir N. Licht, “Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in a 
World of Interacting Securities Markets”, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 563, 631-37 (1998). 
178.See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, “Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation”, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903, 907, 947-48 (1998); 
Roberta Romano, “Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation”, 107 
Yale L.J. 2359, 2362 (1998). But see Merritt B. Fox, “Retaining Mandatory Securities 
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment”, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1338 
(1999). 
179.See Merritt B. Fox, “The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a 
Globalizing Market for Securities”, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 696, 707, 709-11 (1998). 
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1.5. Conclusion 
Throughout all the transformations we have studied, the same pattern recurs. As 
the relationship of the corporation to the state, to society and to its members or 
shareholders changes, all three views of the corporation emerge, submerge and 
then re-emerge in a slightly different but fundamentally similar form. In the end, 
however, the real entity view prevails. 
Why does the real entity view prevail? This is no doubt due in part to the 
fact that it represents the most congenial view to corporate management, because 
it shields them from undue interference from both shareholders and the state. 
Corporate management wields political power and it influences the outcome of the 
debate; judges again and again refer to the importance of corporations, by which 
they mean corporate management. But the very fact that corporate management 
wields this power shows that there is another reason why the real entity view 
prevails: it fits reality much more than the other two. In some periods (e.g., the 
Roman Empire or eighteenth century Europe) the power of the state was 
overwhelming, and the artificial entity view seemed plausible. In other periods 
(the medieval membership corporation or the nineteenth century close 
corporation), the aggregate view seemed plausible. But for a majority of the time, 
equating the corporation either with the state or with shareholders must have 
seemed to most non-academics highly implausible.180 The real entity view 
180.The real entity view is clearly the dominant one in sociology and some branches of economics. 
As one sociologist has stated, “[t]he recurrent problem in sociology is to conceive of corporate 
organization, and to study it, in ways that do not anthropomorphize it and do not reduce it to the 
behavior of individuals or of human aggregates.” Guy E. Swanson, The Tasks of Sociology, 192 
Science 665, 666 (1976). A whole branch of economic sociology centers on the study of 
organizations, and there are numerous books devoted to the topic. Most of these books revolve 
around the study of large corporations, since these are the dominant forms of organization in this 
society. See, e.g., The Handbook of Economic Sociology pt. 2, sec. C (Neil J. Smelser & Richard 
Swedberg eds., 1994); The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Walter W. Powell 
& Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Jeffrey Pfeffer & Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of 
Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1978); W. 
Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems (5th ed. 2003); James D. 
Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (Transaction 
Publishers 2003) (1967). Moreover, they are informed by the economic perspective inaugurated 
by Ronald Coase in his classic “Nature of the Firm” article from 1937 and developed by Oliver 
Williamson and others into transaction cost economics. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of 
the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and 
Organization Theory”, in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, supra note 166, at 77. For a 
critique of Williamson’s theory see Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: 
The Problem of Embeddedness”, 91 Am. J. Soc. 481 (1985). This branch of economics, which 
now forms part of the “new institutional economics,” begins by recognizing that the firm is 
fundamentally different from the market because of its hierarchical structure, and proceeds to 
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prevailed because it was more real than the others. And this observation enables 
us to move from the historical to the contemporary and ask how Citizens United 
and its antecedents fit the historical pattern. 
 
2. Citizens United: A Real Entity Case 
 
The Supreme Court first addressed the question whether corporations had a right 
to engage in political speech under the First Amendment in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti,181 decided in 1978.182 Bellotti involved a Massachusetts statute 
that prohibited banks and business corporations from expending funds on 
advertising to influence the result of political referenda.183 In the context of a 
referendum to introduce progressive taxation on individuals, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the law was constitutional because the First 
Amendment rights of corporations are limited to issues that “materially affect its 
business, property, or assets.”184 
The Supreme Court reversed.185 The three opinions in the case reflect the 
three theories of the corporation. Justice Powell, for a five Justice majority, 
adopted the real entity view, stating 
 
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that 
the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech 
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less 
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an 
individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity 
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its 
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.186 
 
The majority thus treated corporations as equivalent to individuals, citing 
Santa Clara for the proposition that corporations are persons for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes and therefore protected by the First Amendment (as applied 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the states).187 It explicitly rejected the 
 
investigate when operating as a firm as opposed to buying in the market makes sense (the “make 
or buy” issue). Transaction cost economics has become the leading explanation for the most 
recent transformation of the corporation—the rise of multinational enterprises. See generally The 
Nature of the Transnational Firm (Christos N. Pitelis & Roger Sugden, eds., 1991). 
181.435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
182.Id. at 765. 
183.Id. at 767-68. 
184.Id. at 767, 769. 
185.Id. at 767. 
186.Id. at 777. 
187.Id. at 780 & n.15. 
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artificial entity theory advanced by Massachusetts (“corporations, as creatures of 
the State, have only those rights granted them by the State”),188 because the 
national banks that brought the case were “creatures of federal law . . . and their 
existence is in no way dependent on state law.”189 The majority also explicitly 
rejected the aggregate view that the intent of the statute was to protect 
shareholders from management expressing different views than their own, stating 
that the normal “procedures of corporate democracy” are sufficient to protect 
them.190 
The heart of Justice Powell’s opinion lies in his concern that upholding the 
Massachusetts statute would infringe on corporate activities that he viewed as 
beneficial, but unrelated to corporate business operations. He stated: “Thus 
corporate activities that are widely viewed as educational and socially constructive 
could be prohibited. Corporations no longer would be able safely to support—by 
contributions or public service advertising—educational, charitable, cultural, or 
even human rights causes.”191 And Justice Powell rejected as unsupported by the 
record the view that “corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may 
drown out other points of view.”192 This also reflects the real entity view because 
corporations are judged as standing on their own, not as reflecting the views of 
shareholders or as creatures of the state. The aggregate view, as reflected in 
Milton Friedman’s writings from the same period, would object to the same kind 
of “corporate social responsibility” considerations as not being in the 
shareholders’ interests.193 
Justice White’s dissent, on the other hand, advanced the aggregate view. 
He argued 
There is now little doubt that corporate communications come within 
the scope of the First Amendment. This, however, is merely the 
starting point of analysis, because an examination of the First 
Amendment values that corporate expression furthers and the threat to 
the functioning of a free society it is capable of posing reveals that it is 
not fungible with communications emanating from individuals and is 
subject to restrictions which individual expression is not. . . . 
Shareholders in [for-profit corporate] entities do not share a common 
set of political or social views, and they certainly have not invested 
their money for the purpose of advancing political or social causes or 
188.Id. at 778-79 & n.14. 
189.Id. 
190.Id. at 794. 
191.Id. at 782 n.18. 
192.Id. at 789. 
193.See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33. 
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in an enterprise engaged in the business of disseminating news and 
opinion. . . . 
 Of course, it may be assumed that corporate investors are united by a 
desire to make money, for the value of their investment to increase. 
Since even communications which have no purpose other than that of 
enriching the communicator have some First Amendment protection, 
activities such as advertising and other communications integrally 
related to the operation of the corporation’s business may be viewed as 
a means of furthering the desires of individual shareholders. This 
unanimity of purpose breaks down, however, when corporations make 
expenditures or undertake activities designed to influence the opinion 
or votes of the general public on political and social issues that have 
no material connection with or effect upon their business, property, or 
assets. Although it is arguable that corporations make such 
expenditures because their managers believe that it is in the 
corporations’ economic interest to do so, there is no basis whatsoever 
for concluding that these views are expressive of the heterogeneous 
beliefs of their shareholders whose convictions on many political 
issues are undoubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to 
endorse any electoral or ideological cause which would tend to 
increase the value of a particular corporate investment. This is 
particularly true where, as in this case, whatever the belief of the 
corporate managers may be, they have not been able to demonstrate 
that the issue involved has any material connection with the corporate 
business. Thus when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a 
political candidate this does not further the self-expression or self-
fulfillment of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them 
as individuals would.194 
 
This is clearly an aggregate view, and it is congruent with the position 
taken by Justice White in MITE four years later.195 The emphasis is entirely on the 
shareholders, not on the corporation itself. 
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, dissented from an artificial entity 
perspective. He stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment does protect 
corporations, there are limits to such protection because the corporation is a 
creature of the state.196 Citing Dartmouth College, he stated: 
 
The appellants herein either were created by the Commonwealth or 
were admitted into the Commonwealth only for the limited purposes 
described in their charters and regulated by state law. Since it cannot 
be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it 
with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons . . . our inquiry must 
 
194.Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-06 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
195.See supra Part I.C. 
196.Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
35
Avi-Yonah: Citizens United and the Corporate Form
Published by De Gruyter, 2011
Brought to you by | University of Michigan Law School
Authenticated | 141.211.57.157
Download Date | 1/17/14 9:17 PM
seek to determine which constitutional protections are “incidental to 
its very existence.”197 
There can be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation with 
the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly 
guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property 
absent due process of law. Likewise, when a State charters a 
corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily 
assumes that the corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press 
essential to the conduct of its business. . . . Although the Court has 
never explicitly recognized a corporation’s right of commercial 
speech, such a right might be considered necessarily incidental to the 
business of a commercial corporation. 
It cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression 
is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation 
organized for commercial purposes. A State grants to a business 
corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited 
liability to enhance its efficiency as an economic entity. It might 
reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the 
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere. 
Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of political expression 
are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States 
permit commercial corporations to exist. So long as the Judicial 
Branches of the State and Federal Governments remain open to protect 
the corporation’s interest in its property, it has no need, though it may 
have the desire, to petition the political branches for similar protection. 
Indeed, the States might reasonably fear that the corporation would 
use its economic power to obtain further benefits beyond those already 
bestowed. I would think that any particular form of organization upon 
which the State confers special privileges or immunities different from 
those of natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether 
the organization is a labor union, a partnership, a trade association, or 
a corporation. 
. . . . 
I can see no basis for concluding that the liberty of a corporation to 
engage in political activity with regard to matters having no material 
effect on its business is necessarily incidental to the purposes for 
which the Commonwealth permitted these corporations to be 
organized or admitted within its boundaries. Nor can I disagree with 
the Supreme Judicial Court’s factual finding that no such effect has 
been shown by these appellants. Because the statute as construed 
provides at least as much protection as the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires, I believe it is constitutionally valid.198 
197.Id. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 463, 489 (1819)). 
198.Id. at 824-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Rehnquist rejected the argument 
that some of the corporations were not chartered by Massachusetts by pointing out that they were 
all permitted to do business there. Id. at 824 n.2. 
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The positions taken by Justices Rehnquist and White clearly reflect the 
artificial entity and aggregate views. But the majority taking the real entity view 
prevailed, presumably because in 1978 it was hard to view corporations as a mere 
aggregation of their shareholders or as mere creatures of the state. Surprisingly, 
the majority opinion was written by Justice Powell, who, as we have seen, took an 
artificial entity view in MITE and CTS.199 The explanation is that the hostile 
takeover movement threatened the same educational and charitable activities of 
corporations that Powell sought to defend in Bellotti, so in that context he needed 
to empower the state to save “its” corporations. 
The emphasis on the artificial entity view in CTS may also have influenced 
the result in the Court’s next First Amendment case related to corporations, Austin 
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,200 decided three years after CTS.201 The 
issue in Austin was whether a state could ban corporate-direct expenditures in 
support of or in opposition to candidates for state office, as opposed to 
expenditures through “Political Action Committees” (PACs) organized for this 
purpose.202 Justice Marshall, for a six Justice majority that included Rehnquist and 
White, held that the ban was constitutional.203 The majority opinion reflects the 
artificial entity view held by Rehnquist: 
 
State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited 
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation 
and distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital 
and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their 
shareholders’ investments. These state-created advantages not only 
allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, 
but also permit them to use “resources amassed in the economic 
marketplace” to obtain “an unfair advantage in the political 
marketplace.” . . . the political advantage of corporations is unfair 
because 
“[t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are 
not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s 
political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated 
decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these 
resources may make a corporation a formidable political 
presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no 
reflection of the power of its ideas.”204 
 
199.See supra Part I.C. 
200.494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
201.Id. 
202.Id. at 654-55. 
203.Id. at 668. 
204.Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted) (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 
257-58, 1986). 
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We therefore have recognized that “the compelling governmental 
interest in preventing corruption support[s] the restriction of the 
influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate 
form.”205 
The Chamber argues that this concern about corporate domination of 
the political process is insufficient to justify a restriction on 
independent expenditures. Although this Court has distinguished these 
expenditures from direct contributions in the context of federal laws 
regulating individual donors, it has also recognized that a legislature 
might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent corruption posed by 
such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate 
elections . . . . Michigan’s regulation aims at a different type of 
corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of 
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideas. . . . We emphasize that the 
mere fact that corporations may accumulate large amounts of wealth is 
not the justification for § 54; rather, the unique state-conferred 
corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries 
warrants the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth can 
unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of 
independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of 
political contributions. We therefore hold that the State has articulated 
a sufficiently compelling rationale to support its restriction on 
independent expenditures by corporations.206 
Why did the majority emphasize the artificial entity view? It may have 
been influenced by the adoption of that view in CTS. However, it is more likely 
that what really bothered Justice Marshall was “the corrosive and distorting effects 
of immense aggregations of wealth”207 per se, but he could not take that position 
because it was rejected as to rich individuals by Buckley v. Valeo.208 In his dissent, 
Justice Scalia pointed out the weakness of the majority’s position, stating that 
while the state charters corporations, “[i]t is rudimentary that the State cannot 
exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment 
rights,”209 and that the aggregation of wealth argument is inconsistent with 
Buckley.210 Justice Brennan also felt that the majority was on weak ground, and in 
his concurrence took the aggregate view that the purpose of the statute is to 
205.Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01, 
1985). 
206.Id. at 659-61 (citations omitted). 
207.Id. at 660. 
208.This rejection was explicitly recognized by Justice Stevens in Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320, slip 
op. at 2 & n.1 (U.S. 2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
209.494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 
No. 205, Will Cnty., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)). 
210.494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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protect dissenting shareholders.211 Justice Kennedy in his dissent rejected both the 
aggregate and the artificial entity views, relying on Bellotti to argue (in 
accordance with the real entity view) that corporations are equal to individuals, 
and therefore their speech must be protected.212 
We thus arrive at the most recent addition to the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the corporate form, Citizens United.213 The question presented in 
that case was whether Congress could impose the same kind of limits on 
corporations that Michigan state law applied in Austin.214 The Court could have 
ruled narrowly that the limits were unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit 
corporation formed for advocacy purposes by individuals, but decided instead to 
use the case as the foundation for a much broader ruling that all corporate direct 
expenditures are permitted under the First Amendment, overruling Austin.215 
What is remarkable about Citizens United, although maybe not surprising 
to the reader at this point, is that both the majority and the dissent adopted the real 
entity view of the corporation, so that their only disagreement was in divergent 
assessments of the implications for the First Amendment. The majority opinion by 
Justice Kennedy emphasized, for example, that the ban on corporate speech was 
not alleviated by the fact that a PAC organized and controlled by the same 
corporation could speak freely because “[a] PAC is a separate association from the 
corporation.”216 This assertion can only be made under the real entity view 
because under the aggregate view both the corporation and the PAC are owned by 
the same ultimate shareholders, and under the artificial entity view both the PAC 
and the corporation are created by the same state. 
The majority relies on Bellotti for the proposition that “the First 
Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s 
corporate identity.”217 It rejects the “antidistortion” rationale of Austin as 
overbroad and inconsistent with Buckley, and as permitting the government to ban 
speech by media corporations.218 The aggregate view advanced by the Solicitor 
General and by Justice Brennan in his concurrence in Austin is likewise rejected in 
reliance on the “procedures of corporate democracy” of Bellotti.219 Interestingly, 
the majority does not even mention the artificial entity view, even though it (and 
not the antidistortion rationale per se) was key to the holding in Austin. While the 
statute at issue is a federal one, and corporations are chartered by states, it could 
 
211.Id. at 674-78 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
212.Id. at 699 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
213.Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 21, 2010). 
214.Id. at 1. 
215.Id. at 12, 49-50. 
216.Id. at 21. 
217.Id. at 31 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)). 
218.Id. at 34-35, 46. 
219.Id. at 46 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794). 
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be argued that the federal government also confers benefits on business 
corporations by protecting the market that enables them to engage in business.220 
Justice Scalia, in concurrence, did admit that the First Amendment was 
originally intended to apply to individuals, “[b]ut the individual person’s right to 
speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons.”221
But this does not mean that he adopted the aggregate view, since that view, as 
applied to the shareholders, underlays the principal argument of the Government 
and was soundly rejected by the majority.222 Instead, what Scalia meant was 
presumably corporate management working together as an association of persons 
“to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the 
modern free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of 
this speech to the public debate.”223 
Nor does the dissent attempt in Citizens United to advance any view other 
than the real entity view. Instead, it emphasizes that corporations are different than 
natural persons and therefore may be more heavily regulated: 
In the context of election to public office, the distinction between 
corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make 
enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually 
members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may 
be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may 
conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. 
The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of 
corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral 
process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not 
also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the 
potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and 
national races.224 
This is all about the corporation itself, not about the shareholders or the 
state. Similarly: 
The same logic applies to this case with additional force because it is 
the identity of corporations, rather than individuals, that the 
Legislature has taken into account. As we have unanimously observed, 
legislatures are entitled to decide “that the special characteristics of the 
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation” in an 
220.This argument was made to justify a federal tax on state-chartered corporations as early as 
1909. See Avi-Yonah, Corporations, supra note 77, at 1218; see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 
43, 74-75 (1906). 
221.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 7 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
222.Id. at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
223.Id. at 9 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
224.Id. at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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electoral context . . . . Campaign finance distinctions based on 
corporate identity tend to be less worrisome, in other words, because 
the “speakers” are not natural persons, much less members of our 
political community, and the governmental interests are of the highest 
order. Furthermore, when corporations, as a class, are distinguished 
from noncorporations, as a class, there is a lesser risk that regulatory 
distinctions will reflect invidious discrimination or political 
favoritism.225 
 
Not a word is written here on the corporation’s relationship to the state or 
to the shareholders. The artificial entity theory is discussed later in the dissent, but 
purely in a historical context: when explaining the Framers’ view of corporations, 
Justice Stevens emphasized their relationship to the state.226 But he emphasized 
that this was a historical artifact that disappeared with general incorporation 
statutes, and that “many legal scholars have long since rejected the concession 
theory of the corporation.”227 He mentioned briefly the artificial entity rationale for 
Austin, but did not emphasize it in comparison with corporate power.228 
The dissent also addressed the aggregate theory at the very end when 
discussing the dissenting shareholder rationale of Brennan’s concurrence in 
Austin, but only as a limited and secondary argument “beyond the distinctive legal 
attributes of the corporate form.”229 The main emphasis in this section of the 
dissent was on the weakness of the “procedures of corporate democracy.”230 This 
is very far from viewing the corporation as a mere “nexus of contracts” with the 
primary contract being that with the shareholders.231 
The entire Citizens United opinion, both the majority and the dissent, are 
thus reflective of the real entity view. Corporations stand on their own, 
independent of both the state that created them and the shareholders that own 
them. The debate between the majority and the dissent is about what follows from 
this perspective on corporations. In the majority’s opinion, this means that 
corporations are speakers just like individuals and entitled to the same First 
 
225.Id. at 32-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting 
FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982)). 
226.Id. at 36. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Corporations were created, 
supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public entities”). 
227.Id. at 36-37, 41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
228.Id. at 47-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
229.Id. at 89 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
230.Id. at 87-88 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Margaret M. Blair 
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 320 (1999)) 
(voting and shareholder derivative suits are “so limited as to be almost nonexistent” and selling 
the stock faces many practical difficulties). 
231.See Fischel, supra note 135, at 1273 (“A corporation . . . is nothing more than a legal fiction 
that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily entered 
into for their mutual benefit.”). 
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Amendment protection, while the dissent takes the view that because of the 
special characteristics of corporations, they have more limited First Amendment 
rights.232 The dissent remarks: 
The fact that corporations are different from human beings might seem 
to need no elaboration, except that the majority opinion almost 
completely elides it. Austin set forth some of the basic differences. 
Unlike natural persons, corporations have “limited liability” for their 
owners and managers, “perpetual life,” separation of ownership and 
control, “and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution 
of assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy 
their resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders’ 
investments.”233 Unlike voters in U.S. elections, corporations may be 
foreign controlled. Unlike other interest groups, business corporations 
have been “effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s 
economic welfare”234; they inescapably structure the life of every 
citizen. “‘[T]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation,’” 
furthermore, “‘are not an indication of popular support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.’”235 “‘They reflect instead the 
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The 
availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable 
political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be 
no reflection of the power of its ideas.’”236 
It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no 
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help 
structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and 
their “personhood” often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are 
not themselves members of “We the People” by whom and for whom 
our Constitution was established.237 
. . . . 
It is an interesting question “who” is even speaking when a business 
corporation places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a 
particular candidate. Presumably it is not the customers or employees, 
who typically have no say in such matters. It cannot realistically be 
said to be the shareholders, who tend to be far removed from the day-
to-day decisions of the firm and whose political preferences may be 
232.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
233. Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990)).  
234.Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Milton C. Regan, Jr., 
Corporate Speech and Civic Virtue, in Debating Democracy’s Discontent 289, 302 (Anita L. 
Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998)). 
235. Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 
659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986))). 
236. Id. at 75-76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 
659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986))). 
237. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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opaque to management. Perhaps the officers or directors of the 
corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking, except their 
fiduciary duties generally prohibit them from using corporate funds for 
personal ends. Some individuals associated with the corporation must 
make the decision to place the ad, but the idea that these individuals 
are thereby fostering their self-expression or cultivating their critical 
faculties is fanciful. It is entirely possible that the corporation’s 
electoral message will conflict with their personal convictions. Take 
away the ability to use general treasury funds for some of those ads, 
and no one’s autonomy, dignity, or political equality has been 
impinged upon in the least.238 
 
It is hard to imagine a more forceful statement of the real entity view: 
actual human beings disappear almost completely. In a footnote, Justice Stevens 
does acknowledge the existence of other theories of the corporation, but it is clear 
which theory he favors.239 The artificial entity theory advanced by Justice 
Rehnquist in Bellotti, and relied upon by the majority in Austin, and the aggregate 
theory advanced by Justice White in Bellotti and Justice Brennan in Austin have 
almost disappeared, and both the majority and the dissent take the real entity view. 
Like so many times before, the real entity view reigns supreme once again. 
 
Conclusion: What’s Next? 
 
As the reader can expect by now, it is hardly likely that this state of affairs will 
remain stable forever. When the next transformation in the status of corporations 
is addressed by the Court, it is inevitable that the artificial entity and aggregate 
theories of the corporation will re-emerge to once again contend with the real 
entity view. In fact, one can see this process germinating even now within Citizens 
United. 
 
238.Id. at 75-77 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
239.Justice Stevens writes: 
 Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state 
concession, a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or 
any other recognized model. Austin referred to the structure and the advantages of corporations 
as “state-conferred” in several places, but its antidistortion argument relied on only the basic 
descriptive features of corporations, as sketched above. It is not necessary to agree on a precise 
theory of the corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural persons in fundamental 
ways, and that a legislature might therefore need to regulate them differently if it is human 
welfare that is the object of it concern. 
Citizens United, 08-205 at 76 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal 
citations omitted) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660, 665, 667). 
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An important rhetorical comment made by Justice Stevens in his dissent, 
and echoed by other critics of the decision (like President Obama in the State of 
the Union address),240 is its impact on the rules restricting foreigners from 
participating in U.S. elections. Justice Stevens stated that the majority’s approach 
“would appear to afford the same protection to multinational corporations 
controlled by foreigners as to individual Americans.”241 This drew a strong 
disclaimer from the majority, arguing that even if the Government has a 
compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political process, the 
corporate expenditure ban is overbroad because it “is not limited to corporations 
or associations that were created in foreign countries or funded predominantly by 
foreign shareholders.”242 
Predictably, Congress will react by reaffirming that the ban on 
contributions and expenditures made by foreign nationals applies to foreign 
corporations.243 But how will Congress define what is a foreign corporation? 
The majority in Citizens United envisaged two possibilities. One was to 
define foreign corporation as a corporation created by a foreign state.244 This 
approach is one taken by our tax laws, and it follows the artificial entity view.245
The problem, of course, would be that if this were the only definition, it would be 
too easy for foreigners to become Americans merely by incorporating a shell in 
one of the states. 
The other approach mentioned by the majority was to take the aggregate 
view and look at the identity of the shareholders, so that a corporation the majority 
of whose shareholders are U.S. citizens will count as American and others as 
foreign.246  
240.President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) in 156 CONG. REC. H418 
(daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (“[L]ast week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I 
believe will open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign corporations—to spend 
without limit in our elections.”). 
241.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
242.Id. at 47. 
243.See 2 U.S.C. section 441(e)(2006). The DISCLOSE Act, introduced by Sen. Schumer and Rep. 
Van Hollen, defines foreign corporation as any corporation incorporated overseas and any 
domestic corporation that is either 20 percent owned or de facto controlled by foreign nationals, 
which is a combination of all three views. See H.R. 5175, S. 3295 (111th Cong. Sess. 2), § 102. 
244.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 47. 
245.See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (5), (30) (2006). But see I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B) (defining some 
foreign corporations as domestic based on the identity of their shareholders). 
246.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 47. 
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This may work for closely held corporations. For example, this approach is 
used in determining foreignness for purposes of the rules restricting foreign 
ownership of media and transportation corporations.247 But for publicly traded 
multinational enterprises, the aggregate view is very difficult to maintain because 
the shares trade on multiple exchanges, the ownership is constantly shifting, and 
most of the owners trade under “street names” that make it very hard even for the 
IRS to know their true identities. Thus, I predict that the same reasons that forced 
the Court to abandon the aggregate view for diversity jurisdiction will apply in 
this context as well. 
A third possibility would be to take the real entity view and confront 
directly the question of whether corporations in a globalized world have a 
meaningful nationality. As discussed above this issue is extensively debated and 
reasonable minds can differ.248 It lies at the heart of the current transformation of 
the corporate form from mainly national to multinational enterprises that do not 
owe any particular allegiance to any state. 
Whatever the ultimate outcome of this debate, it is already possible to 
predict that once again the real entity definition of the nationality of corporations, 
which focuses on where they are “managed and controlled,” will triumph over a 
narrow focus on the creating state, too remote and manipulable, and the 
shareholders, too remote and diffused.249 To be continued… 
 
 
247.See Gregory P. Cirillo & Christopher M. Mills, Federal Restrictions on Foreign Participation 
in Commercial Aviation and Related Fields, in 2 MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1, 11-13 (J. Eugene Marans et al., eds., 3d ed. 2004); Christina H. Burrow et al., 
Foreign Investment in the United States Communications Industry, in 2 MANUAL OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra at 247. 
248.See Reich, supra note 169, at 53-54; Tyson, supra note 172, at 37-38. 
249.“Managed and controlled” is a familiar definition of corporate residency from the tax laws of 
many countries, relying on a U.K. House of Lords decision from the nineteenth century. See 
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH ET AL., GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON TAX LAW (forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 195-96) (on file with author). Justice Stevens seems to take this view because he 
speaks of corporations “managed and controlled” by foreigners. See Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 
2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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